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Municipal Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Monell v. Department of Social Serv-
ices of the City of New York — In 1961, access to the federal courts for litigants
seeking redress under section 1983 1
 for violations of federal constitutional
rights was greatly expanded by the United States Supreme Court decision of
Monroe v. Pape.' In Monroe, the Court held that official misconduct, although
violating state law, nevertheless may be action taken "under color of" state law
for purposes of a section 1983 claim. 3
 However, while increasing the availa-
bility of section 1983 remedies in actions against municipal employees, the
Monroe Court placed a substantial limitation on its holding by excluding
municipalities and other local government units from the scope of section
1983. 4 Stating that municipalities are not "persons" within the meaning of
that section, the Court in Monroe granted municipalities absolute immunity
from section 1983 liability. 5
In the sixteen years following Monroe, the Supreme Court reaffirmed, on
several occasions, the absolute municipal immunity rule established by that
decision. 8 In its 1977 term, however, the Court in Monell v. Department of
Social Services of the City of New York' overruled that portion of Monroe which
had excluded municipalities from the scope of section 1983, 8 and held that
henceforth municipalities do not enjoy absolute immunity from section 1983
liability. 9
 Athough expanding further the availability of section 1983 rem-
edies by including municipalities within the scope of that section, the Monell
Court also limited its holding by prohibiting the use of the doctrine of respon-
deal superior in section 1983 actions against municipalities" and by adopting a
narrow interpretation of the concept of municipal action."
The plaintiffs in Monell, female employees of the New York City Board
of Education (the Board) and the New York City Department of Social Serv-
ices (the Department), instituted a class action suit in federal district court on
' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
torn, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to he subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
2
 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
" Id. at 183-87.
• Id. at 187-92.
• Id. at 191. In reaching its decision to exclude municipalities from the scope
of § 1983, the Monroe Court specifically reserved judgment on the constitutional ques-
tion whether Congress possesses the power to impose liability on municipalities for the
acts of municipal employees who violate the civil rights of individuals. Icl.
• 
See. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. I, 5 (1976); City of Kenosha v. Bruno,
412 U.S. 507. 513 (1973); Moor v. County of Alameda. 411 U.S. 693, 710 (1973). Sec
text at notes 55-77 infra.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
8 Id. at 663.
" Id. at 690.
1 " Id. at 691-95.
" Id
. at 690-91, See text at notes 128-29 infra.
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behalf of themselves and other female city employees similarly situated." The
defendants in the suit were the Board and its Commissioner, the Department
and its Chancellor, and the City of New York and its Mayor. 13 The plaintiffs
alleged that, due to the official rules and regulations of the defendant-
agencies, they had been forced to take unpaid maternity leaves of absence
before medical reasons required them to do so, and thus had been deprived
of their constitutional right of due process." Federal jurisdiction was based
on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)' 5 with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 providing an express right of
action. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as back pay
for the time they were not permitted to work."
Although the district court determined that the official policy in question
had violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs," it concluded that the
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot,'H Considering the
remaining claim for back pay, the court held that, pursuant to Monroe and its
progeny, the defendant-agencies were immune from suit under section
1983.' 9 Although the individual defendants did not enjoy such immunity,
the court recognized that any monetary judgment against these defendants
ultimately would be paid from the city treasury." The court, therefore, con-
cluded that the Monroe rule mandated dismissal of the claims against the indi-
vidual defendants as well."
12 Id. at 660.
13 Id. at 661. Each of the three individual defendants was sued only in his
official capacity. Id.
14 ,rd,
15 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:... (3) To redress the
deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for
equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
" 436 U.S. at 661.
17 Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 394 F.
Supp. 853, 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In determining that the policy in question was uncon-
stitutional, the district court relied on the Supreme Court decision of Cleveland Bd.. of
Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). The Court in LaFleur held that a policy enforc-
ing mandatory maternity leaves of absence violates the due process clause. Id. at 651.
1e F. Supp. at 855. Subsequent to filing the complaint but prior to trial,
the Department and the Board had changed their maternity leave policy so as to pro-
vide that no female employee was required to report her pregnancy or take a leave of
absence while she was physically able and willing to perform her duties. Id.
19 Id.
2" Id. The district court reasoned that, because the individual defendants had
been sued solely in their official capacities, any money judgment rendered against
them would be paid with city funds. Id.
" Id. In determining that a judgment against the individual defendants would
violate the absolute municipal immunity rule of Monroe, the court relied on the reason-
ing found in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Supreme Court in Edelman
held that, although injunctive relief can be awarded against a state official sued in his
official capacity, money damages cannot be awarded if they are to be paid from the
state treasury. The Court held that such an award would violate the eleventh amend-
ment. Id. at 663-71.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court." Plaintiffs on appeal had argued strongly that
the Board of Education was an entity which was independent of the city and,
as such, was a "person" under section 1983. 23
 The court of appeals, em-
phasizing the Board's fiscal dependency on the city, rejected this argument,"
and held that the Board, like the City and the Department, was immune from
section 1983 liability." Addressing the claims against the Commissioner, the
Chancellor, and the Mayor, the court of appeals employed reasoning similar
to that of the lower court, and determined that a monetary judgment could
not be awarded against these defendants when such a judgment would be
paid with city funds." The circuit court concluded, therefore, that it was
without jurisdiction to hear the suit. 27
The Supreme Court granted certiorari's and reversed the decision of the
Second Circuit." After re-examining the reasoning of Monroe and the legis-
lative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871," the Court held: municipalities
and other local government units are "persons" within the meaning of section
1983. 31
 In reaching its decision, the Court overruled Monroe to the extent
that it had granted municipalities absolute immunity from suit under section
1983. 32
 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, announced that
municipalities may be sued under section 1983 for monetary, declaratory, and
injunctive relief when a constitutional violation is caused by the application of
an official policy, regulation, ordinance or custom." The Court further
stated, however, that the doctrine of vicarious liability is inapplicable to section
1983 actions." Thus, the Court held that municipalities cannot be liable
22
 Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 532 F.2d
259, 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
23 Id. at 263. Although the plaintiffs had conceded that the Department was
not a "person" under § 1983, they argued that the Board was directly suable under §
1983. In support of this argument, the plaintiffs relied on three prior decisions in
which § 1983 actions were allowed to proceed against school boards. Id. at 264. The
three decisions relied on were Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976
(1975); and Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
24
 532 F.2d at 263-64. The court of appeals did not consider itself bound by
the precedents cited by the plaintiffs because the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
had not been specifically considered in those cases. Id. at 264.
25 id,
26 Id. at 264-67.
27
 Id. at 266.
28
 429 U.S. 1071 (1977).
29
 Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S.
658, 702 (1978). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which [ustices
Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, Stewart, and White joined, and in which Justice Stevens
joined in Parts I, III, and V. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion and Justice
Stevens wrote a statement concurring in part. Justice Rehnquist dissented and wrote
an opinion in which Chief justice Burger joined.
39
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a codification of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
31
 436 U.S. at 690.
32
 Id. at 663.
33
 Id. at 690-91.
34 Id. at 691.
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under that section for the constitutional violations of municipal employees
solely on the basis of respondent superior. 35 The Court observed that in the
present controversy, the unconstitutional action clearly had resulted from the
application of an official policy and, hence, the complaint stated a valid cause
of action. 3"
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion'". in which he expressed his
approval of the majority's reasoning. Noting the line of cases in which the
Court had assumed section 1983 jurisdiction sub silentio over school boards,
Justice Powell emphasized the necessity of the Court's holding in Monell to
preserve the integrity of those decisions." Justice Stevens concurred in part.
He did not join in those portions of the majority opinion which considered
the issues of vicarious liability and municipal immunity under Section 1983
because he viewed them as merely advisory. 39 Justice Rehnquist, writing a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger joined, 40 concluded that in
the absence of signs of congressional displeasure with the Monroe interpreta-
tion of section 1983, 4 ' the Court should not abandon what he viewed as well-
reasoned precedents, 42 but rather should adhere to the doctrine of stare de-
cisis. 43
The significance of the Monell decision lies in the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of the Monroe rule of absolute municipal immunity from section 1983
liability. By including municipalities within the definition of a section 1983
"person", the Court has expanded further the availability of federal statutory
remedies for constitutional violations committed "under color of" state law.
The impact of the decision is substantially diminished, however, by the
Court's prohibition of the use of the doctrine of respondeat superior in section
1983 actions against municipalities, and by its circumscription of a limited
category of municipal action which will result in section 1983 liability.
In analyzing the probable impact of Monell, this Note initially will outline
the background of the decision, focusing on the emergence of direct four-
35 Id. Although the term respondeat superior is merely the Latin expression for
the concept of vicarious liability, it is often used to denote a specific type of vicarious
liability: that which makes a master liable for the torts of his servants. See generally, W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 69 (4th ed. 1971) (hereinafter PRossER).
In this Note, the phrase respondeat superior refers to the master's liability for the torts of
his servants.
36
 436 U.S. at 694-95.
37 Id. at 704-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 710-11, citing 436 U.S. at 663 n.5.
3" Id. at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
4" Id. at 714-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" Justice Rehnquist was correct in noting that there has been no visible sign
of congressional displeasure with the Monroe interpretation of § 1983. Several bills
which would have amended § 1983 and supplanted the rule of absolute municipal
immunity have been introduced in the legislature, but none has gained passage. For a
partial listing of these bills, see Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1060 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978).
42 See cases cited at note 6 supra.
43
 436 U.S. at 714.
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teenth amendment actions against. municipalities." It then will discuss the
reasoning employed by the Monell Court in reaching its decision both to in-
clude municipalities within the scope of section 1983, and to prohibit the use
of the doctrine of respondeat superior in section 1983 actions against
municipalities. The Note then will analyze the perceived weakness of the
Monell rule of municipal liability. This discussion will focus primarily on the
problematic aspects of the Court's narrow interpretation of the concept of
municipal action. Finally, it will be submitted that the Court should adopt a
broader definition of municipal action, thereby expanding its rule of munici-
pal liability under section 1983.
I. FROM MONROE To MONELL:
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's decision of Monroe v. Pape 45 is widely viewed as the
birthplace of modern civil rights litigation.'" The Monroe Court held that the
unauthorized conduct of thirteen Chicago police officers who had broken into
and ransacked Monroe's home, was action taken "under color of" state law
within the meaning of section 1983, despite the fact. that such action violated
Illinois state law." The Court further held that Monroe was not required to
exhaust the remedies available to him under Illinois law before invoking the
federal remedy contained in section 1983 in a federal forum.'"
The Court, however, dismissed that portion of Monroe's complaint which
named the City of Chicago as a defendant. Concluding that "Congress did not
undertake to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of Section
1983,"" the Court held that municipalities could not be subject to liability
under that section.'" The Monroe Court's decision to immunize municipalities
from section 1983 liability was based on the House of Representatives' rejec-
tion of the Sherman amendment, a proposed addition to the Civil Rights Act
44 A direct fourteenth amendment action •is one in which the substantive
cause of action of the plaintiff rests solely on a violation of the fourteenth amendment
and not on a federal statute which explicitly creates a cause of action for violations of
the fourteenth amendment.
45 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
46 See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 211 (3d ed. 1976); P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SFIAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 950 (2d ed. 1973).
47 '365 U.S. at 183-87. The Court in Monroe adhered to the meaning which
had been given the phrase "under color of" state law in United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299, 326 (1941) and reaffirmed in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109
(1945). In Classic the Court held that "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law, is action taken 'under color of state law." 313 U.S. al 326.
" 365 U.S. at 183. The Court indicated that although the Constitution of
Illinois made unreasonable searches and seizures unlawful, and that therefore there
existed a state law which, if enforced, would give Monroe relief, this fact was no bar-
rier to the instant suit. Id.
49
 Id. at 187.
5" Id. at 191-92.
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of 1871." The Sherman amendment would have subjected local government
units to liability for damage which resulted from violence occurring within
their borders. 52
 The Court reasoned that the rejection of this amendment
was indicative of congressional intent to exempt municipalities from civil liabil-
ity under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now section 1983). 53 Thus,
based upon the foregoing reasoning, the Monroe Court established a rule of
absolute municipal immunity from section 1983 liability.
The Monroe Court's decision to shield municipalities from section 1983
liability had harsh .repercussions. Under the rule of absolute municipal immu-
nity, victims of the unconstitutional conduct of municipalities and municipal
officials were restricted to seeking redress from low-level—often judgment-
proof—municipal employees." This result of the inflexible Monroe rule
prompted many plaintiffs in civil rights actions arising out of municipal mis-
conduct to fashion various legal theories designed to circumvent the rule. An
examination of the fate of several of these theories, however, reveals that the
Supreme Court consistently thwarted all attempts to avoid the Monroe rule of
absolute municipal immunity. 55
" There were in fact three different versions of the Sherman amendment..
For a concise overview of these three drafts, see Mown, 436 U.S. at 665-69.
52
 It was actually the second version of the amendment, the first conference
draft, which would have subjected municipalities to liability for private violence. The
first conference draft read in pertinent part as follows:
That if any house, tenement, cabin, shop, building, barn, or granary shall
be unlawfully or feloniously demolished, pulled down, burned, or de-
stroyed, wholly or in part, by any persons riotously and tumultuously as-
sembled together; or if any person shall unlawfully and with force and
violence be whipped, scourged, wounded, or killed by any persons riot-
ously and tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any per-
son of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, or to deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or
by reason of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in every such
case the county, city, or parish in which any of the said offenses shall be committed
shall be liable to pay full compensation to the person or persons damnified
by such offense, if living, or to his widow or legal representative if dead;
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 749, 755 (1871).
For the full text of the other two drafts of the amendment see Monett, 436 U.S. at
702-04 app.
'" 365 U.S. at 191. The Monroe Court noted that "[T]he response of the Con-
gress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being brought
within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot
believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include them." Id.
" Cf. Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1273 (8th Cir. 1973) (complaint
against defendant deemed to be judgment-proof dismissed); Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966) ("[N]either the personal assets of policemen nor the
nominal bonds they furnish afford genuine hope of redress.").
'" There is, however, one legal theory aimed at avoiding the Monroe rule of
municipal immunity which has not yet been directly considered by the Supreme Court.
This is the possibility of bringing an action against a municipality in which the substan-
tive cause of action is based solely on the fourteenth amendment and not on the enabl-
ing statute, § 1983. See, e.g., Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir.
1976); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372
F. Supp. 647, 649-51 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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One such theory, employed in an effort to attach liability for constitu-
tional violations to a local government unit despite the absolute immunity rule
of Monroe, was advanced in Moor v. County of Alameda. s6 The plaintiffs in
Moor instituted an action against the sheriff, four deputy sheriffs, and the
County of Alameda in an attempt to recover damages for injuries sustained
when one deputy sheriff allegedly wrongfully discharged a shotgun into a
crowd. 57 The plaintiffs asserted both state and federal causes of action
against the individual defendants and the county. The federal causes of action
against the county were brought under section 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988."
Section 1988 provides that when federal law is found to be ineffective to carry
out fully the objectives of the Civil Rights Acts, the federal courts shall be
guided by the common law and statutes of the states, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the laws of the United States." The plaintiffs in Moor ar-
gued that section 1988 permitted a federal court to adopt California state law
to the extent that it makes a county vicariously liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of its sheriff and deputy sheriffs." The Supreme Court, rejecting
the plaintiffs' argument, concluded that section 1988 was not intended to
facilitate the wholesale incorporation of entire state causes of action, 6 ' and
therefore dismissed this claim against the county."
." 411 U.S. 693 (1973). The plaintiffs, Moor and Rundle, had filed two sepa-
rate actions in the district Court but these actions were consolidated on appeal. Id. at
698.
s7
	at 695.
." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) reads in pertinent part:
the jurisdiction in civil ... matters conferred on the district courts by [the
Civil Rights Acts] ... for the protection of all persons in the United States
in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and en-
forced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws
are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adopted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to
furnish suitable remedies the common law, as modified and changed
by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having juris-
diction of such civil cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to
and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
59 See note 57 supra.
6" 411 U.S. at 698. The county vigorously disputed the plaintiffs' interpreta-
tion of the California Tort Claims Act of 1963, Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2(a), which the
plaintiff contended made a county vicariously liable for the acts of its sheriff and dep-
uties committed in violation of the Federal Civil Rights Act. Because the issue of the
proper interpretation of the section had not been decided by either of the lower
courts, the Supreme Court did not consider it. 411 U.S. at 696 & n.3.
"i 411 U.S. at 703-04.
f;2 Id. at 710. The plaintiffs had also argued that the district court had power
to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law claims against the county. The Su-
preme Court concluded that the district court was correct in refusing to exercise pen-
dent jurisdiction, where no independent basis of jurisdiction existed. It therefore up-
held the dismissal of the state law claims which had been brought on this theory. Id. at.
717.
The plaintiff Moor, however, claiming that he was a citizen of Illinois, asserted
that the district court had the power to hear his state law claims on the basis of diver-
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Another attempt to circumvent the Monroe rule of absolute municipal im-
munity was made in City of Kenosha v. Bruno. 63 The plaintiffs in City of
Kenosha, two tavern owners, alleged a denial of their right to procedural due
process. The denial resulted, plaintiffs asserted, from the failure of the City
of Kenosha to afford • them an opportunity for an adversary hearing before
the city refused to renew their liquor licenses." Suit was brought against the
city under section 1983, and declaratory and injunctive relief was sought. The
district court concluded that due to the equitable nature of the claims it pos-
sessed jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § l343(3)." 3 Al-
though neither party had raised the jurisdictional issue on appeal, the
Supreme Court determined that. the district court had erred in accepting ju-
risdiction over the city." -Hie Court concluded that the Monroe rule of absolute
immunity of municipalities from section 1983 liability was not limited to ac-
tions for monetary relief and rejected "the proposition that a city is a 'person'
under section 1983 where equitable relief is sought, but is not a 'person'
under the same section where damages are sought". 67
sky of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976). Although both the district court and the
court of appeals had held that the County of Alameda was not a "citizen" of California
for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed this finding and
held that Moor's state law claim against the county was within diversity jurisdiction.
411 U.S. at 721.
" 412 U.S. 507 (1073).
" Id. at 508. Although the plaintiffs had been given a public hearing on the
issue of renewal of their licenses, none of the testimony at the hearing was recorded,
no speakers were sworn, and no cross-examination of the speakers took place. The
plaintiffs' claim of denial of procedural due process rested on the fact that the public
hearing had lacked these characteristics of an adversary proceeding. Id. at 510-11.
65 Misurelli v. City of Racine. 346 F. Supp. 43, 45 & n.1 (E.1). Wis. 1972). 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) is the jurisdictional counterpart of § 1983. For text of § 1343(3) see
note 15 supra.
6° 412 U.S. at 513.
" Id. Although the Supreme Court determined that § 1983 and its jurisdic-
tional counterpart were not a proper basis for federal jurisdiction, it remanded the
case for a determination of the amount in controversy and the availability of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 as a jurisdictional basis. Id. at 514-15. Section 1331 provides in pertinent part
that "the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 and arises under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States ..." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). The
remand of City of Kenosha is significant because the Court seems to imply that if the
amount in controversy in that case was determined to he at least $10,000, section 1331
would provide a basis for federal jurisdiction. Section 1331, however, is a purely juris-
dictional statute and does not itself grant any substantive cause of action. Because the
Court in City of Kenosha had already determined that the cause of action contained in
section 1983 was not available to the plaintiffs, it would appear that the violation of the
fourteenth amendment would be the sole souce of the substantive claim. As a result,
many courts have viewed the remanding of City of Kenosha as an indication of the
Supreme Court's willingness to recognize- the validity of direct fourteenth amendment
actions against municipalities. See, e.g., Calvin v. Conlisk, 520 F.2d 1. 8-9 (7th Cir.
1975), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rizzo v. Goode, 424 U.S. 902
(1976); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d
799, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1974) (dictum); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647,
649-51 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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Employing yet a third theory in an attempt to by-pass the Monroe rule of
absolute municipal immunity, the plaintiff in A ldinger v. Howard "" urged the
Court to exercise pendent jurisdiction"" over state law claims against the
County of Spokane. 7 ° The plaintiff in Aldin ger had been discharged from
her position in the County Treasurer's office without a hearing. Alleging that
the discharge violated her constitutional rights under the first, ninth and
fburteenth amendments, the plaintiff brought. suit against various individual
county officials and the County of Spokane. 7 ' The claims against the officials
were based on section 1983. A state law claim against the County was
grounded on state statutes which the plaintiff claimed waived the County's
sovereign immunity, making it vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its
employees." The plaintiff asserted that the federal court could exercise
pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim against the County, even though
no independent basis for federal jurisdiction over that party existed."
After re-affirming its holdings in City of Kenosha and Monroe that
municipalities are absolutely immune from suit under section 1983, 74 the
Court considered the plaintiff's pendent jurisdiction argument. and its
applicability to the County of Spokane. The Court initially indicated that the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is primarily designed to give the federal
courts jurisdiction over additional claims and not over additional parties who
otherwise would be beyond the reach of the federal court. 75 The Court then
concluded that, in light of the fact that the federal courts are "courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction marked out by Congress" 7" and that Congress had refused to
extend section 1983 jurisdiction to municipalities, it would he an improper use
of judicial discretion for the Court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the
County of Spokane in the instant case. 77 The Court, therefore, dismissed the
claims against the County.'"
Unlike the theories discussed thus far, one final technique used by plain-
tiffs seeking to avoid the Monroe rule of absolute municipal immunity has met
with limited success, but only at the lower court level. This technique emerged
after the Supreme Court decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
" 427 U.S. I (1976).
"9 "Pendent jurisdiction" is a doctrine which permits a federal court that has
jurisdiction over a claim arising under the federal constitution or the laws or treaties of
the United States, to adjudicate a state claim which is so closely connected to the fed-
eral claim as to warrant the "conclusion that the entire action before the court com-
prises but one constitutional 'case.' " United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966).
7" 427 U.S. at 2-3. The state law claims were based on state statutes which had
waived the sovereign status of the county and made it vicariously liable for the torts of
its officials. Id. at 5.
71 Id. at 3-4.
" Id. at 4-5.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 5.
75 Id. at 14.
76
 Id. at 15.
77 Id. at 19.
78 Id.
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Agents." The plaintiff in Bivens alleged that federal narcotics agents, acting
under color of federal authority, illegally entered and searched his apartment,
and then arrested him without either an arrest or a search warrant. 8° If the
allegations were true, Bivens had been deprived of his fourth amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The defendants
argued, however, that Bivens should be relegated to his state tort law remedy
for invasion of privacy because there existed no federal statute which granted
monetary relief for the fourth amendment violations by federal agents." The
Supreme Court rejected the defendants' argument" and concluded that a
valid cause of action against the federal agents arose directly from the fourth
amendment." The Court further concluded that money damages were a
proper form of redress for Bivens' injuries."
Victims of constitutional violations committed by municipalities and their
employees immediately recognized the Bivens rationale as a potential vehicle
for circumventing the absolute municipal immunity rule of Monroe. Plaintiffs
in civil rights actions urged the courts to extend the Bivens rationale to allow
for a remedy against municipalities directly under the fourteenth amendment,
despite the absence of a federal statute authorizing such a remedy." Al-
though this argument, calling for an extension of the Bivens rationale, has met
with some success in the lower courts," its validity has not been addressed
79
 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
"" Id. at 389.
81 Id. at 390. By its own terms, § 1983 applies only to action taken under
color of state law and was therefore of no assistance to Bivens. Also, until it. was
amended in 1974, the Federal Tort Claims Act did not apply to the intentional mis-
conduct of federal agents. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976).
82
 403 U.S. at 390-92. The defendants argued that the fourth amendment.
should he viewed only as a limit on the extent to which they, in a state tort action,
could claim to have been acting under federal authority. Id. at 390-91.
83 Id. at 390-95.
84 Id. at 395-96.
85
 In a direct fourteenth amendment suit, federal jurisdiction is based on the
general federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Direct four-
teenth amendment actions, therefore, must meet the minimum amount in controversy
requirement of $10,000. No such requirement exists for suits brought under § 1343 in
conjunction with § 1983.
88 See, e. g., Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193, 195-96 (2d Cir. 1977); Owen v.
City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York, 98 S. Ct. 3118 (1978); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554, 559 (6th Cir.
1976) (remanded l'or amount in controversy determination); Reeves v. City of Jackson,
532 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 1976); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47. 50 (4th Cir. 1975);
Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520
F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1975); Roane v. Callisburg Independent School Dist., 511 F.2d
633, 635 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1975); Mayhanks v. Ingraham, 378 F. Supp. 913, 914-16 (E.D.
Pa. 1974); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp, 647, 649-51 (N.D. Cal. 1974). But
see Jones v. McElroy, 429 F. Supp. 848, 857 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Perry v. Linke, 394 F.
Supp. 323, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Snietanka v. Borough of Ambridge, 378 F. Supp.
1366, 1377-78 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (dictum).
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yet by the Supreme Court. 87 Some of the lower courts, focusing on the de-
sirability of providing the victims of unconstitutional conduct with adequate
and meaningful remedies, extended the rationale employed in Bivens and al-
lowed municipalities to be subject to liability directly under the fourteenth
amendment." Moreover, of the courts which have so extended Bivens, a
number also have allowed liability for the constitutional infractions of munici-
pal employees to attach to the municipality vicariously under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. 89
In sum, during the sixteen years following Monroe, four different legal
theories emerged, each aimed at avoiding the rule of municipal immunity
established by that decision. The theories propounded in Moor, City of
Kenosha, and Aldinger have been considered untenable by the Supreme Court.
The viability of the fourth theory, the direct fourteenth amendment suit, has
not been tested at the Supreme Court level. Thus, although efforts at avoid-
ing the Monroe rule have been largely unsuccessful, these efforts demonstrate
that the dfissatisfaction generated by the rule has been plentiful.
. MONELL —THE REASONING
BEHIND THE DECISION , '
Against this background, the Supreme Court in Mond/ again reconsi-
dered its Monroe decision. Determining that Monroe had "misapprehended the
meaning of [section 1983],"" the Monett Court rejected the rule of absolute
municipal immunity from section 1983 liability. In Monroe, the Supreme
Court had based its conclusion that municipalities were not "persons" within
the meaning of section 1983 on. its analysis of the congressional debates con-
cerning the first conference committee draft of the Sherman amendment."
The Sherman amendment would have subjected a "county, city or parish" to
liability for property damage or personal injury caused by persons "riotously
and tumultuously assembled" within its borders. 92 Individual representatives
87 It is uncertain what the role of the direct fourteenth amendment action will
he after Mandl. Plaintiffs who now suffer a deprivation of constitutional rights as the
result of the implementation of official policy or adherence to governmental custom
will have a cause of action against the municipality under section 1983. Resort to a
direct fourteenth amendment action, therefOre, would appear to he largely unneces-
sary.
88 See, e.g., Murray v. Murray, 441 F. Supp. 120, 122-23 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Wil-
hams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 159 (N.D. I11. 1975).
"" See, e.g., Culp v. Devlin, 437 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Santiago v.
City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 148 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Cullum v. Yurclovitch, 409
F. Supp, 557, 559 (N.D. 111. 1975). It would appear that the only possible use the
direct fourteenth amendment action could serve after NIonell would be as a vehicle for
circumventing the Monet! rule against the use of the doctrine of respondent superior in
section 1983 actions against municipalities. This tactic already has been attempted un-
successfully in two cases. See Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 44{) U.S. 914 (1978); Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978).
41) 436 U.S. at 700 (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
"I See note 50 supra.
"2 For the pertinent text of this version of the amendment. see note 51 supra.
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who had voiced constitutional objections to the amendment were doubtful
that the federal government possessed the authority to impose "any obligation
upon county and town organizations, the mere instrumentality for the ad-
ministration of slate law."" These opponents viewed the Sherman amend-
ment. as an attempt to impose on municipalities indirectly an obligation to
keep the peace by establishing municipal liability for breaches of the peace. "a
The Monell Court observed that it was this congressional unwillingness to im-
pose a specific obligation on local government units which the Monroe Court
had equated with a prohibition against the imposition of civil liability on
munieipalities. 95
The Monell Court's re-examination of the legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 revealed the error of the Monroe Court's conclusion. Jus-
tice Brennan first. observed that many of the opponents of the Sherman
amendment perceived no constitutional barrier to the imposition of civil liabil-
ity on those municipalities which had been given the obligation to keep the
peace by the state, but which had failed to fulfill this obligation in a manner
violative of the fourteenth amendment." Second, the Monell Court pointed
out that by 1871 the power of the federal judiciary to enforce the contract.
clause of the Constitution against municipalities was well established."' This
fact, the Court reasoned, also demonstrate's that the Congress at, that time
thought it permissible to impose liability on municipalities for their direct vio-
lations of the Constitution." The Monell Court thus determined that:
Since § 1 of the Civil Rights Act [now § 1343 and § 1983] simply
conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment—a situation precisely analogous to the
grant of diversity jurisdiction under which the Contract Clause was
enforced against municipalities—there is no reason to suppose that
opponents of the Sherman amendment would have found any con-
stitutional barrier to § 1 suits against municipalities."
The Monell Court concluded, therefore, that the Monroe Court was in error in
interpreting the rejection of the Sherman amendment as a congressional deci-
sion against municipal liability.
93 436 U.S. at 664 (quoting CONG. GLOBE at 804 (1871) (Rep. Poland) (em-
phasis omitted)).
94
 436 U.S. at 673.
95 Id. at 664-65.
96 The Monell Court observed that Representative Poland, an opponent to the
passage of the Sherman amendment, expressed this position when he stated that:
[W]here a State had imposed a duty [to keep the peace' upon [a] munici-
pality ... an action would be allowed to be maintained against them in the
courts of the United States under the ordinary restrictions as to jurisdic-
tion. But enforcing a liability, existing by their own contract, or by a State
law, in the courts, is a very widely different thing from devolving a new
duty or liability upon them by the national Government.... "
Id. at 680 (quoting CONG. GLOBE at 794).
" 436 U.S. at 673 & n.28.
99
 Id. at 681-82.
99 Id.
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The Monell Court further emphasized the error of the Monroe decision
by noting that those representatives who had voted in favor of section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act, many of whom subsequently voted against passage of the
Sherman amendment, well understood that section 1 would subject municipal
officials to liability for constitutional violations committed by them in their of-
ficial capacities. too Because state independence is impafred to an equal de-
gree whether federal power is exercised on individual state officials or corpo-
rate state agencies,'" the Mandl Court reasoned that those congressmen
who had voted in favor of section 1 would not have objected to the inclusion
of municipalities within the scope of that section."'
• Having found the Sherman amendment debates devoid of any indication
that Congress intended to exempt municipalities from liability for their own
fourteenth amendment violations, the Mond! Court proceeded to analyze sec-
tion 1 of the Civil Rights Act itself." 3 Justice Brennan discussed the relevant
factors which suggest the proper statutory interpretation of section 1. First,
section 1 is a remedial act, and as such should be broadly construed. 10" The
Court reasoned that, since municipalities are capable of causing the very harm
that section 1 was intended to remedy, the section should be interpreted as
applying to municipalities in the absence of a clear congressional directive that
they are to be exempt. 105 The Mond! Court found no such directive in the
legislative history. On the contrary, the Court observed that by the year 1871
Congress well understood the usual meaning of the word "person" to include
municipal corporations.'°'
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, the Mandl Court concluded that
Congress had intended to include municipalities within the ambit of section
1983. 107 The Court therefore held that municipalities and other local gov-
ernment henceforth will be subject. to suit pursuant to section 1983 for con-
stitutional violations occasioned either by 1) the implementation of "a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promul-
11 ' 1
 Id. al 682 & 11.41. Because section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was
directed specifically at "persons" it was undoubtedly understood to apply to individual
officials. Id.
111
 Id. at 682. "Both are state instrumentalities and the state could be impeded
no matter over which. sort of instrumentality the Federal Government [seeks] to assert
its power." Id.
'°2 Id. at 682-83.
103 See note 29 supra.
1 " 436 U.S. at 684-86.
1 ° 5 Id. at 685-86.
"" Id. at 687-89. The Court traced the historical developments which had led
to the common practice of including municipal corporations within the meaning of the
word "person." The Court indicated that the longstanding belief that corporations
were not persons, which had been adopted in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809), had been overruled in Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Let-
son, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844). In 1869 the principle established in Letson, that
corporations were persons, was extended to municipal corporations. Cowles v. Mercer
County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118, 121 (1869). Id.
"7 436 U.S. at 690.
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gated by that body's officers,"'" or by 2) the adherence to a governmental
"custom" even though such custom has not received official approval.'"
Although the Monell Court was willing to impose liability on
municipalities for constitutional violations caused by the implementation of
official policies or adherence to governmental customs, it would not go so far
as to subject a non-culpable municipality to liability for the unconstitutional
conduct of its employees acting without official directive. The question of the
availability of the doctrine of respondeat superior was not present. in the Monell
dispute, however the Court addressed this issue in strongly worded language.
The Court stated, "in particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be
held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a munic-
ipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." 10
In reaching this conclusion the Court again examined both the statutory lan-
guage and the legislative history of section 1983. The Court initially decided
that the specific wording of section 1983 could not easily be read to include
the concept of vicarious liability."' The Court reasoned that by employing
the words "subject" and "causes to be subjected" in section 1983," 2 Congress
had injected into the statute an element of causation and actual culpability
without which liability may not be imposed. 13
After determining that the specific statutory language of section 1983 did
not indicate that Congress intended liability to attach vicariously under that
section, the Court discussed whether the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871 supported its interpretation of the section. In summary fashion,
the Court concluded that those representatives who had perceived a constitu-
tional barrier to the imposition on municipalities of a federal obligation to
keep the peace by means of the Sherman amendment likewise would have
seen a constitutional barrier to the imposition of a federal law of municipal
vicarious liability under section I. 14 The Court further observed that two
common justifications for the doctrine of vicarious liability had been offered
by proponents of the Sherman amendment in support of the amendment's
passage."' These justifications were, first, that vicarious liability has a deter-
rent effect on the repetition of wrongful conduct, and second, that vicarious
liability is a vehicle for spreading the risk of wrongful conduct to society as a
whole.'" Despite the appealing aspects of these justifications, Congress
11 ) 11 Id.
"" Id. at 690-91.
1 " Id. al 69 I.
"' Id. at 692.
"2
 Section 1983 states that,"1,elvery person who, under color of any statute, Or-
dinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights ...."
(emphasis added). See note 1 supra for full text of § 1983.
436 U.S. at 692. The Court stated that "the fact that Congress did specifi-
cally provide that A's tort became B's liability it' B 'caused' A to subject another to a
tort suggests that Congress did not intend 1983 liability to attach where such causa-
tion was absent." Id.
14 Id. at 693.
115  hi. at 694,
''" Id.
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nevertheless had determined that they were insufficient to overcome the con-
stitutional infirmities which were perceived to exist in the Sherman amend-
ment."' Accordingly, the Monell Court concluded that it would be unrealistic
"to suppose that a more general liability [vicarious liability] imposed for ...
similar reasons would have been thought less constitutionally objection-
able.""" Therefore, the Court concluded that municipalities cannot be held
vicariously liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional conduct of
municipal employees.
III. THE STRENGTH AND THE WEAKNESS
OF THE MONELL DECISION—
AN ANALYSIS AND AN ALTERNATIVE RULE
In reaching its decision in Monell, the Supreme Court was faced with the
always difficult and unpleasant task of overruling one of its prior decisions.
Heeding Justice Frankfurter's oft cited maxim "not to reject [wisdom] merely
because it comes late,""" however, the Court correctly overruled that por-
tion of Monroe which had absolutely immunized municiaplities from section
1983 liability. The Court's holding in Monell, bringing municipalities within
the ambit of section 1983, clearly was well founded. As Justice Powell noted in
his concurring opinion in Monell, Monroe's odd result of exempting
municipalities from liability while allowing section 1983 suits to proceed
against the individual municipal employees who merely performed the
ministerial function of implementing official policy, begged for reconsidera-
tion of the Monroe holding. 120 Section 1983 was intended to provide a fed-
eral, civil remedy for violations of constitutional rights "under color of" state
law. As Justice Powell recognized, few categories of action so readily fulfill the
"under color of" state law requirement as action taken pursuant to official
government mandate. 121 The Monroe rule of absolute municipal immunity
had forced victims of unconstitutional conduct occasioned by official munici-
pal policy to seek their sole redress from municipal employees who often were
shielded from liability by a good-faith immunity defense. 122 The victims,
1 " Id. The reasoning employed by ihe Court at this juncture is somewhat
obscure. If the Representatives had determined that a federally imposed obligation to
keep the peace was unconstitutional, it is difficult to perceive that any justification
could serve to remove the constitutional infirmities.
"8 Id. at 694. Again the Court's reasoning is unclear. Under the first confer-
ence draft of the Sherman amendment, municipalities would have been subjected to
liability for damage resulting from the violence of private citizens. See note 51 supra.
Municipal liability based on the doctrine of respondeai superior would make a municipal-
ity liable only for the torts of its employees. It therefore appears that, contrary to the
Court's position, municipal vicarious liability based on respondeal superior is a more re-
strictive species of liability than that contained in the Sherman amendment.
"9 Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
120 436 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 707 (Powell, J., concurring).
122 Cf. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315, 322 (1975) (good faith immunity
defense available in § 1983 actions); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-491 (1974)
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therefore, remained umcompensatecl for their injuries, while the municipality
which had directed or sanctioned the enforcement. of the unconstitutional pol-
icy escaped liability. The Monett Court determined that the Monroe interpreta-
tion of section 1983 which led to this distressing result was an inaccurate in-
terpretation of the law.
The Monroe Court's reliance on the rejection of the Sherman amendment
was also misplaced. The motivation behind the rejection of the Sherman
amendment was Congress' belief that the imposition on municipalities of a
federal obligation to keep the peace would have been an interference with a
purely local matter reserved to the states under the tenth amendment. 123 Be-
cause state governments traditionally had been free to allocate local police
power among their political subdivisions as they saw fit, a federal law which
would effectuate a forced re-allocation of that power apparently was viewed
by the Congress as an unconstitutional usurpation of state authority. 124 The
inclusion of municipalities within the scope of section 1983, however, does not
give rise to such tenth amendment problems. Section 1983 was enacted by
Congress pursuant to its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
as a means of enforcing section 1 of the same amendment. 125 Although sec-
(officers of executive branch of state government enjoy a qualified good faith immu-
nity); Hana v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1975) (good faith defense availa-
ble to seven city building inspectors). See generally Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense to
Suits for Police Deprivations of Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991 (1975).
123
 The tenth amendment provides: "ItThe powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
The following statement by Representative Blair illustrates the tenth amendment
concerns present throughout the Sherman amendement debates.
['Mere are certain rights and duties that belong to the States ... there are
powers that inhere in the State governments. They create these
municipalities, they say what their powers shall be and what their obliga-
tions shall be. If the Government of the United States can step in and add
to those obligations, may it not utterly destroy the municipality?
CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 795 (1871).
1 " Id. at 795. In determining that a federal obligation to keep the peace im-
posed on municipalities would be unconstitutional, Representatives relied on the deci-
sions in Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 113 (1871) (federal government had no
power to tax the salary of a state officer), overruled in Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939), and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16. Pet.) 539
(1842) (Congress has no power to lay duties on state officers). Id.
125
 The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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tion 1, by its terms, is addressed only to states, it is well established that.
municipalities; as instrumentalities of state government, are equally bound by
the provisions of the section. 12" The Monell Court recognized that "the doc-
trine of dual sovereignty ... put[s] no limit on the power of federal courts to
enforce the Constitution against municipalities that [violate] it."'" Thus, in a
long overdue decision, the Supreme Court wisely abandoned the ill-advised
doctrine of absolute municipal immunity from section 1983 liability.
Although the Court's decision to reject the Monroe doctrine appears un-
assailably correct, a similar conclusion is not easily reached regarding the
specific rule of municipal liability adopted by the Monell Court. It is clear that.
not every post-Monell constitutional violation committed by a municipal
employee will result in municipal liability. On the contrary, the Court stated
"it. is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose. edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsi-
ble under § I983." 128 The perceived weakness of the Monell decision lies in
the narrowness of this newly-adopted rule of municipal liability.
Although the specific conduct involved in the Monell case fell within the
confines of the Court's rule of municipal liability, much of the conduct of
municipal employees which results in constitutional violations apparently lies
beyond its scope. Incidents of police brutality which rise to the level of' con-
stitutional deprivations would seem to be all too common examples of
excluded conduct. To say that few, if any, municipalities have officially
adopted policies, or customs so well established that they can be characterized
as official policy, which authorize such conduct merely states the obvious.
Thus, under the Monell rule, the vast majority of these constitutional viola-
tions will not result in municipal liability under section 1983.
Some authors have suggested that the adoption of a standard of munici-
pal liability in section 1983 actions which incorporates the doctrine of respon-
deal superior is the sole means of adequately protecting the constitutional rights
of individuals from the excesses of municipal employees.' 29 Under such a
standard of liability, which was specifically rejected by the Monell Court,'"
municipalities would incur section 1983 liability for all constitutional violations
committed by municipal employees acting within the scope of their employ-
ment."'
There are several attractive aspects of a standard of municipal liability
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. 12 The most compelling argu-
12C See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 389 (1969); Avery v. Midland
County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474, 479 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1958).
'27
	
U.S. at 680.
' 28 Id. at 694.
1 " Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 136-37 (1972); Comment, Toward State and Municipal Liabil-
ity in Damages for Denial of Racial Equal Protection, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1142, 1158-59
(1969); Note, Vicarious Liability Under Section 1983, 6 [ND. L. REV. 509 (1973).
1 " See text at note 109 supra.
121 See generally, PROSSER, supra note 34,	 69.
132 Among the various justifications which have been offered for the doctrine
of respondeat superior are: 1) the Master is able to control the servant and if he fails to
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ment in support of such a standard of liability is that it would act as a deter-
rent to the commission of future constitutional violations by municipal
employees. A municipality which will incur automatic liability under section
1983 for every constitutional violation committed by its employees acting
within the scope of their employment is apt to adopt policies of careful selec-
tion, proper training, and adequate discipline of its employees in an effort to
reduce the number of constitutional violations, and thereby to reduce the
number of adverse section 1983 judgments.
It is clear that the Monett rule will not have this deterrent effect. Limiting
municipal liability under section 1983 solely. to situations where constitutional
violations result from the implementation of official poliCies or customs, the
rule provides municipalities with no incentives to police more actively the ac-
tions of their employees. The Monell rule permits municipalities which are
willing to purge their by-laws, regulations, and record books of any official
policies susceptible to attack on constitutional grounds, to immunize them-
selves again from section 1983 liability. Thus, although the Monett rule of
municipal liability may be a welcome step away from the unsupportable Mon-
roe doctrine, it would appear to fall far short of providing adequate protection
for the constitutional rights of individuals.
Although the perceived defect in the Monett rule—its lack of any deter-
rent effect—provides strong support for the position that a satisfactory rule
of municipal liability must. include the doctrine of respondeat superior, an alter-
native rule of municipal liability exists which would provide the deterrent ef-
fect offered by a standard based on respondent superior, without straying from
the exact language of the statute. It will be recalled that the Monett Court's
strongest objection to a standard of municipal liability which would incorpo-
rate the doctrine of respondeat superior was the wording of section 1983 that
indicated liability under that section must he based on actual culpability. 133
The hallmark of the doctrine of respondeat superior, a species of vicarious liabil-
ity', is that. liability attaches in the complete absense of culpability.'"
It is suggested that by focusing on the concept of municipal action, rather
than on the standard of liability, one can fashion a rule of municipal liability
under section 1983 which would deter future wrongdoing, unlike the Monett
rule, and which would conform to the language of section 1983, unlike a rule
based on respondent superior. Because municipalities can act only through their
employees and agents, any attempt to distinguish municipal action front the
action of municipal employees is plagued with conceptual difficulties. However,
the Monell Court's line of demarcation between these two sources of conduct
seems particularly inappropriate. The language employed by the Court
suggests that it is the prior authorization of unconstitutional conduct which will
do so, he should suffer the consequences; 2) the master has chosen the servant and
has first placed him in a position to act; 3) imposing liability on the master will deter
future wrongdoing. See generally PROSSER, supra note 34, at 459; James, Vicarious Lia-
bility, 28 TULANE L. REV. 161, 165-73 (1954); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 Co[Aim, L.
Rcv, 444, 455 (1923).
133
 See text at notes 110-12 supra.
"4 See generally PROSSER, supra note 34. § 69.
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trigger municipal liability. "5 The appropriate definition of municipal action
not only should include conduct of municipal employees which has been au-
thorized, either expressly or implicitly, by municipal "policymakers" in ad-
vance, but also should include that conduct which is subsequently ratified by
the municipality. ' 3 " If a municipality itself treats certain conduct of its
employees as municipal action by ratifying that conduct, it is both appropriate
and equitable for the courts likewise to view the conduct as municipal action.
It remains to be determined, however, what factors properly shall be
considered evidence of municipal ratification for purposes of this expanded
concept of municipal action. At this juncture, substantial guidance can be de-
rived from the settled principles of the law of Agency. It is well established
that ratification of an act by a principal "can he manifested in a variety of
ways, as by a verbal statement, a writing, the acceptance of the benefits or by
doing nothing after learning of the unauthorized act." 37 Although instances in
which municipalities affirm wrongful conduct by way of express verbal or
written approval of the conduct may be rare, it is submitted that affirmation
through passive inaction is not uncommon. A municipality which becomes
aware of wrongful conduct that has been taken on its behalf and fails to re-
pudiate that conduct, demonstrates its acquiescence in the conduct. Under
this analysis, the failure of municipal officers having knowledge of wrongful
conduct to take disciplinary action against the blameworthy employee should
be viewed as significant evidence of municipal ratification of the wrongdoing.
If such ratification has occurred, the municipality should be held accountable
for the conduct in the same manner as the actual wrongdoer. Such accounting
properly should include the possibility of section 1983 liability. Thus, al-
though the rule of municipal liability proposed here retains the standard of
liability based on culpability found in the Monett rule, it increases the potential
exposure of municipalities to section 1983 liability. Under the proposed rule,
a municipality would be considered "culpable" if it either had authorized or
ratified conduct which is determined to be violative of section 1983.
The potential deterrent effect of the proposed rule of municipal. liability
is apparent. Such a rule would motivate municipalities to discipline actively
and adequately wrongdoing employees in order to demonstrate their repudia-
tion of the wrongful conduct. and thereby to insulate themselves from possible
liability, under section 1983. Concurrently, the institution by municipalities of
''" See text at note 127 supra.
"" The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a direct
fourteenth amendment action against a municipality, adopted a rule of municipal
liability which included the concept of municipal ratification. The Second Circuit,
however, subsequently dismissed the action, upon remand from the Supreme Court.
Turpin v. Mallet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (en bane), vacated and remanded for recon-
sideration in light of Mond sub nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin. 439 U.S. 974 (1978),
modified, Turpin v. Mailet, 591 F.2d 426 (1979) (per curiam) (en bane). The Turpin
Court had held that "a damage action can be maintained against a municipality to
redress injuries resulting from those actions of its employees that have been au-
thorized, sanctioned or ratified by municipal officials or bodies functioning at a
policy-making level". 579 F.2d at 164.
137 W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 67 (1964) (emphasis added).
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agressive disciplinary policies would operate to deter future wrongdoing by
municipal employees. It is recognized that this suggested rule is not problem
free. The most difficult issue raised by the rule is determining what type and
amount of discipline will be sufficient to demonstrate municipal repudiation
of unconstitutional conduct. Clearly, action which is "disciplinary" in form
only, and which lacks any actual punitive substance should not be deemed
sufficient to insulate the municipality from section 1983 liability. The question
whether specific disciplinary measures are adequate to demonstrate municipal
repudiation, however, should be an isue for the trier of fact, to be decided on
a case by case basis. In sum, this issue would appear to be no more formidable
an obstacle to the just resolution of section 1983 actions than is any other
factual issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
In holding that a municipality may be liable under section 1983 for con-
stitutional violations caused by the implementation of official policy or gov-
ernmental custom, the Monet! Court has cast a final blow to the tottering Mon-
roe rule of absolute municipal immunity from section 1983 actions. The
Court's failure to recognize that passive inaction, as well as affimative action,
is a sound basis for municipal liability, however, greatly reduces the practical
significance of the Molten decision. As a step toward reducing the number of
constitutional violations committed "under color ()f" state law, the Court
should adopt a rule of municipal liability which subjects municipalities to sec-
tion 1983 liability for unconstitutional conduct which they either expressly or
implicitly authorize, or which they subsequently ratify. Such a rule falls clearly
within the language of section 1983 and would afford greater protection for
the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the people than that presently al-
forded by the Monet! rule.'"
MARY E. CORBETT
238 Editor's Note
In 1980 the Supreme Court addressed a question left unanswered by i he
Monet! decision. In Owen v. City of Independence, 48 4389 (April 15, 1980), the
Court held "that a municipality may not assert the good faith of its officers or agents
as a defense to liability under § 1983." 48 U.S.L.W. at 4394.
